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Section 303 of the United States (US) Senate's version of The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2001 (S. 2507) stipulates fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment of no more than 3 years for the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. One significant intent of S. 2507 is to more fully 
establish a rule of law covering such disclosure through the definitions of "authorized," "classified 
information," and "officer or employee of the United States." However, the problem with S. 2507 is that 
it focuses on definitions as opposed to real-world problems. 
 
Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information continue to exhibit a sense of 
entitlement by leaking classified information to advance or impede policies and political careers and to 
exhibit their own specialness. In fact, some of those who claim the greatest degree of being shocked and 
appalled at leaking continue to finely hone their own leaking skills--even as a cover for their own leaking. 
 
Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information often are aware that much more 
information is classified than needs to be. This state of affairs occurs courtesy of (1) hypervigilant 
guardians who border on and go beyond the borders of the clinically paranoid; (2) over-compensators 
for feelings of inferiority who approach grandiosity with the power to classify and to withhold 
information and view people without access as the great unwashed; (3) malignant narcissists who 
merely arrogate to themselves the quest for continual upgrades in being special; and (4) shame and 
blame avoidant who operationalize avoiding by keeping information from the light of day. The 
realization that overclassification exists facilitates a comfort level in not following the strictures of 
protecting classified information. 
 
Leaking and overclassification are significant enough in themselves as security problems--even if their 
proponents usually do not intentionally seek to damage national security. However, these problems 
become even more significant in that they can be exploited by allied, neutral, and adversary political and 
intelligence operatives--directly through securing information and indirectly through "false flag 
operations," wherein the intentional leaker or overclassification divulger becomes an unintentional 
committer of treason. As well, both problems weaken the rule of law--the very construct that legislators 
try and reinforce. And these problems can only noxiously interact with other problems--viz, intentional 
espionage, sabotage, and treason. These last problems are further fueled by invalid models of human 
behavior and motivation on the part of legislators. Finally, all problems are somewhat dependent on yet 
other cognitions, emotions, and motivations of the legislators and their interactions with aspects of the 
legislative system. 
 
Thus, as opposed to focusing on semantics, the US Senate and the US House of Representatives as well 
might do better to focus on political psychology. (See Guest, D.E. (1998). Is the psychological contract 
worth taking seriously? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19, 649-664; Kleinmann, M. V., & Krise, E. F. 
(1957). Mental illness and classified information. United States Armed Forces Medical Journal, 8, 1007-
1016; Linn, L. (1973). Psychiatric factors in security screening. American Journal of Psychiatry, 130, 648-
652; O'Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, Margaret L. (1981). Prepared lies, spontaneous lies, 
Machiavellianism, and nonverbal communication. Human Communication Research, 7, 325-339; S. 2507, 
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Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Reported to the Senate) SEC. 303, Prohibition On 
Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c106:4./temp/~c106rOuQEX:e1313; Turnley, W. H., & Feldman, D. C. (1999). The impact of 
psychological contract violations on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Human Relations, 52, 895-922.) 
(Keywords: Classified Information, Intelligence, Leaking, Overclassification.) 
 
 
 
2
International Bulletin of Political Psychology, Vol. 9, Iss. 12 [2000], Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol9/iss12/4
